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ABSTRACT. This paper presents a procedure to select equitable stable
allocations in two-sided matching markets without side payments. The
Equitable set is computed using the Equitable algorithm. The algorithm
limits the set of options available for each agent throughout the proce-
dure. The stable matchings selected are generally not extreme, form a lat-
tice and satisfy the condition of being “Ralwsian” in each partition of
the market. The Equitable algorithm can also be used to select a par-
ticular matching from the Equitable Set favoring particular agents inde-
pendent of the side of the market to which they belong.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following situation: Imagine we have to form
groups of surgeons and anesthetists. Surgeons will have differ-
ent levels of expertise and fields, and the anesthetist also will
have different levels of expertise. Both groups have preferences
over the members of the other groups. To allocate them we
can use different procedures preserving the stability of the final
outcome. If we decide to match them using the deferred accep-
tance procedure, we shall ask them for their preferences on their
potential matches, and decide whether to use the algorithm
where surgeons propose first, or the other way around. The
group proposing will be favored in the final matching. However,
both groups are experts in their fields and there is no trivial
reason to impose one group’s preferences over the other. There
might even be some evidence that balanced teams, in which
none of the agents has his best partner but none has his worst
either, perform better. Therefore, we need an algorithm able to
compromise between both groups’ ideal match.
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The need for compromise solutions is particularly acute in
bilateral matching markets. In these markets, the set of stable
solutions reflects the strong polarization of the interest that the
participants have, i.e., the best stable matching for surgeons is
the worst possible matching for anesthetists and vice versa.
This paper proposes a way to select compromise stable
matchings in one-to-one matching markets without side pay-
ments. The selected stable matchings are called Equitable. This
set of solutions is fair, fairness being defined in the sense of
Rawlsian justice (Rawls, 1971). It also selects a subset of stable
matchings and gives the planner control over the final outcome.
The literature on matching markers presents different
approaches to compromise solutions,whichare in some sense fair.
Anaxiomatic approach to the problemof fair algorithmswas pre-
sented inMasarani andGokturk (1989).Theydefine a fairmatch-
ing algorithm by a set of four axioms (Gender Indifference, Peer
Indifference,MaximinOptimality, and Stability). They show that
not all preference profiles admit a fair matching algorithm, and
that even the algorithm generating the mutual agreement match
has no chance to be fair. This approach concentrates on the algo-
rithm, not on the resulting matchings.
In a transferable utility context, Bennett (1988) character-
izes bargaining consistent conjectures and the (stable) match-
ings that are stable with respect to these conjectures. Assuming
a particular bargaining structure, Rochford (1984) develops the
set of Symmetrically Pairwise-Bargained allocations. Roth and
Sotomayor (1998) have shown how this set reflects the same
polarization of interest that characterizes the core of the match-
ing markets. These results suggest some avenues through which
to address the issues of equity and distribution that arise in
two-sided matching markets. At the same time, they show that
the polarization of interests that exists in the core of two-sided
matching markets may be even more fundamental than previ-
ous results have suggested.
In models where participants’ preferences are assumed to be
ordinal, most solution criteria impose cardinality over partic-
ipants’ preferences. The first of these results was attributed to
Selkow by Knuth (1976) and it is inspired by the utilitarian
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solution. Another approach in the same vein is the Sex-Equal
Matching (SEM) presented by Romero-Medina (2001). This
measure is based on the minimization of the envy difference
between the sets of men and women, while preserving sta-
bility. The imposition of cardinality implies problems in the
measurement of the intensity of the participants’ preferences.
Furthermore, the stable matchings that are selected are usually
not unique and have no particular structure.
This paper maintains the ordinal framework and presents
results similar to those produced by a bargaining process
within the context of transferable utility. The paper’s results are
obtained by fixing an arbitrary order of the participants and
limiting the set of acceptable partners for the participants in
the market throughout the procedure. These two characteris-
tics impose a power balance between the participants involved
in the allocation process. This fact characteristic trickles down
to in the stable matchings selected by the procedure. The set of
Equitable matchings is not empty and generally different from
the men’s or women’s optimal stable matching for a particular
market. The matchings in the Equitable Set form a lattice and
satisfy the condition of being Rawlsian in each partition of the
market. The matching selected by the procedure depends on the
order in which the participants make proposals on the proce-
dure. The paper shows how this order can be used to give the
planner some control over the final allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2,
provides a formal definition of concepts. the Equitable Algo-
rithm is defined in Section 3. In Section 4, the main results
are presented. Section 5 analyzes the concept of “Rawlsian by
partitions” that is satisfied by the set of Equitable matchings.
The last section is devoted to some final remarks.
2. THE MODEL, NOTATION, AND DEFINITIONS
Let us consider a bilateral market with two finite disjoint sets
M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wm}, the sets of men
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and women, respectively. Here mi ’s preferences Pmi are described
by a linear order on W ∪ {mi} . Given to women wj,wh ∈W, the
expression wjPmiwh means that mi prefers to be matched to wj
rather than wh;miPmiwh means that mi prefers to stay single
rather than beenmatched towh. Similarly, each womanwj ’s pref-
erences Pwj are described by a linear order on M ∪
{
wj
}
. The
preferences of any participant are represented by a list, Pmi =
w1,w2, . . . ,mi,wt ,wt+1, . . . ,wherew1 ismi ’s most preferredmate,
w2 is his second most preferred mate and so on. Throughout the
paper, it is assumed that no participant is indifferent between any
two potential mates, or between any possible mate and the no-
marriage option. The marriage problem is fully described by a
triplet (M,W,P ), where P is a preference profile containing a full
description of the agent’s preferences.
A matching is a function µ:M ∪W →M ∪W, such that
(1) (µ(mi) /∈W ⇒µ(mi)=mi), and (µ(wj) /∈M ⇒µ(wj)=wj),
and
(2) µ(mi)=wj ⇔µ(wj)=mi.
A matching µ is blocked by an individual mi in the market
(M,W,P ) if and only if miPmiµ(mi). A matching that cannot be
blocked by any individual is called individually rational. Amatch-
ing µ is blocked by a pair (mi ,wj) in the market (M,W,P ) if and
only if wjPmiµ(mi) and miPwjµ(wj). Any individually rational
matching for (M,W,P ) that cannot be blocked by pairs is said to
be stable for this market. In this matchingmarket the set of stable
matchings coincides with the core of this market.
Let (P ) be the set of all possible stable matchings in the
market (M,W,P ). The set of stable matchings forms a distrib-
utive lattice under a natural ordering relation. It implies the
existence of M-optimal and W -optimal stable matchings. Let
us denote these matchings by µM and µW , respectively. The
µW stable matching is the worse stable matching for all the
men and vice versa.
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3. THE EQUITABLE ALGORITHM
In this section, the Equitable Algorithm is introduced. The
main characteristic of the Equitable Algorithm is that it
requires “patient” behavior on the participants. This behavior
is modeled so as to not allow the participants to accept pro-
posals that can damage them severely in the first stages of the
procedure.
The Equitable Algorithm requires the order of the partici-
pants to be fixed. This order plays a relevant role in the final
output of the process. Let ∗ be the equitable algorithm with
ζ ∗ as the starting order for the participants. Let µ∗ be the
outcome of ∗.
EQUITABLE ALGORITHM ∗:
• Step 0: We fix an arbitrary order ζ ∗ for the participants.
• Step 1: The first agent in ζ ∗, say m1 ∈M, makes an offer
to the first women on his preference list of acceptable
women. The women who receives the proposal accepts m1
if he is her first option in her preference list. Otherwise she
rejects m1. If she accepts the offer of m1 she blocks man
m1 to make any further offer. The algorithm proceeds in
the same way, following the order in ζ ∗, for all the partic-
ipants in ζ ∗ that are not blocking an offer.
• Step k: the first person in ζ ∗ among the men and women that
are not blocked or are not blocking an offer after Step k −
1, are called p ∈M ∪W. They propose to his/her most pre-
ferred person on its preference list of acceptable participants.
The person who receives the proposal accepts it if p is among
her/his k best choices and/or is better than the proposal she/he
is blocking, otherwise she/he rejects p. In case of a rejection
p proposes to his/her second most preferred choice among
his/her k first choices.The algorithmproceeds in the sameway,
following the order in ζ ∗, for all the participants in ζ ∗ that are
not blocking an offer, i.e., are available.
If a proposal is accepted by an agent that is blocking
an offer, the next agent to propose will be the one that
was held by him/her. After this, the algorithm proceeds
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following the order in ζ ∗, for all the participants in ζ ∗ that
are not blocking an offer.
• Stop: The Algorithm terminates at a step where for each
men and women the following holds: either p’s proposal is
held by some other person in the other side of the market,
or p has proposed to all of his/her acceptable partners. The
outcome of the algorithm is the matching at which each
person is matched to the person that he or she is blocking
when the algorithm stop. Persons who did not receive a pro-
posal or are rejected by all the persons he/she proposes to,
remain unmatched. We denote by ∗[P ] the matching that
algorithm ∗ yields when applied to a profile P .
PROPOSITION 1. TheEquitableAlgorithm∗ always generates
a stable matching according to P .
Proof. We first check that the outcome of ∗ is stable. The
proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that at the end of
the procedure we can find a blocking pair (mb,wb) in the
resulting allocation. It means that there exists a blocking pair
such that wbPmbµ
∗
(mb), and mbPwbµ
∗
(wb).
Given that the algorithm has terminated, then either both
agents are blocking an offer or at least one of them is
unmatched.
Assume, w.l.o.g., that mb is unmatched at the end of the
procedure. If at least one agent in a blocking pair remains
unmatched on µ∗ and the algorithm 
∗ has ended, it means
that the unmatched agents has proposed in the last round of
the algorithm to all his acceptable partners including wb, and
wb rejects his offer. In this case µ∗(wb)Pwbmb and therefore
(mb,wb) is not a blocking pair. The same argument holds if
both agents are unmatched at the end of the procedure.
Assume that both agents are blocking an offer at the end
of the procedure such that µ∗(mb) = mb and µ∗(wb) = wb,
and the pair (mb,wb) blocks µ∗. If this is the case, it must
be that both agents have received early proposals that they
accept without having the chance to interchange proposals.
Assume that wb was blocking a proposal from µ∗(wb) before
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she becomes acceptable for mb and mbPwbµ
∗
(wb). In that case,
we shall prove that it is impossible for mb to hold a proposal
µ∗(mb) such that wbPmbµ
∗
(mb) before proposing to wb.
Suppose that mb accepts a proposal before wb is acceptable
for him and blocks it until the algorithm has ended. In that
case µ∗(mb)Pmbwb, a contradiction.
Suppose that mb accepts a proposal before wb is acceptable
for him and blocks it until wb accepts a proposal and this
proposal is dropped by µ∗(mb) before the algorithm finishes.
In this case, the procedure gives the chance to mb to propose
to all his acceptable partners before any acceptable partner
can hold him. In that case if mbPwbµ
∗
(wb) then wb can drop
her present match and accept mb’s proposal. If mb does not
offer to wb it is because
• she is not acceptable to him yet or,
• because an offer for a better match is accepted first.
If wb is not acceptable at this stage and mb becomes held
before she is acceptable then mb is held by an agent he prefers
over wb. If not, then wb is acceptable and mb will propose to
her. If she rejects it is because she is blocking a better offer.
Therefore (mb,wb) is not a blocking pair at this stage.
If along the algorithmwb lost her tentative partner shewill pro-
pose immediately after and the same argument follows. Therefore
the algorithm will not permit the existence of blocking pairs.
Let us fix an arbitrary order ζM for the participants under
the restriction that all men precede all women. Let M denote
the Equitable Optimal Algorithm for men, i.e., when ζM is
used, and µM denotes the Equitable Men’s Optimal Stable
Matching, its outcome. Analogously, µW denotes the Equita-
ble Women’s Optimal Stable Matching.
Let P be the preferences P where we delete from men’s
preferences participants ranked below their mates in µW , and
we delete from the original women’s preferences the partici-
pants ranked below their mates in µM . The Equitable Set is
the set of stable matchings in the market (M,W,P). Let us
denote the Equitable Set by .
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The following example shows how the algorithm works and
how the initial order of the participants gives priority to some
participants over others.
EXAMPLE 1 [Roth and Sotomayor (1990, p. 70)]. Consider a
market with two sets of participants M ={m1,m2,m3,m4} and
W ={w1,w2,w3,w4} with the following preferences:
m1 :w1,w2,w3,w4,m1, w1 :m4,m3,m2,m1,w1,
m2 :w2,w1,w4,w3,m2, w2 :m3,m4,m1,m2,w2,
m3 :w3,w4,w1,w2,m3, w3 :m2,m1,m4,m3,w3,
m4 :w4,w3,w2,w1,m4, w4 :m1,m2,m3,m4,w4,
The set of stable matching of this market is represented in the
following picture.
The men are omitted and matchings are represented by the
number of women who are matched with men numbers one,
two, three and four, respectively.
We apply M and W to achieve P that defines . The
M goes as follows: in the first step we order the partici-
pants, all the men come first and all the women come after
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them. The M first step restricts participants’ preferences to
their first element and the participants make proposals in the
selected order. There is no match in the first step. During the
second step, we add the second element to the preferences of
all the participants and try again in the same way. There is no
match either. The outcome of the third step is the following:
m1 m2 m3 m4 w1 w2 w3 w4
w1 w2 w3 w4 m4 m3 m2 m1
[w2] [w1] [w4] [w3] m3 m4 m1 m2
w3 w4 w1 w2 [m2] [m1] [m4] [m3]
In the above table, the first row depicts the participants
while the rest of the rows depicts their preferences. In the
third step, man m1 proposes to w1, then to w2 and w2 accepts
his proposal. The same happens for m2, and his proposal is
accepted by w1. After all the men propose, there is no partici-
pant unmatched and the algorithm ends. The Equitable Men’s
Optimal Stable Matching is
µM ={(m1,w2) , (m2,w1) , (m3,w4) , (m4,w3)} .
The equitable women’s algorithm works in the same way
with all women proposing before the men. There is no
match in this algorithm until the third step. It is the follow-
ing:
w1 w2 w3 w4 m1 m2 m3 m4
m4 m3 m2 m1 w1 w2 w3 w4
[m3] [m4] [m1] [m2] w2 w1 w4 w3
m2 m1 m4 m3 [w3] [w4] [w1] [w2]
In the third step each woman proposes to her second ele-
ment, she is accepted and the algorithm stops. The Equitable
Women’s Optimal Stable Matching is
µW ={(m1,w3) , (m2,w4) , (m3,w1) , (m4,w2)} .
In this example there are two SEMs as defined in
Romero-Medina (2001). This matchings are
µSEM1 ={(m1,w3) , (m2,w1) , (m3,w4) , (m4,w2)} ,
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µSEM2 ={(m1,w2) , (m2,w4) , (m3,w1) , (m4,w3)} .
Both matchings are included in the Equitable Set. However,
this circumstance is not general. The Equitable Set and the
SEM are independent and complementary solution concepts.
The SEM presents a matching that minimizes envy between
men and women and it is a cardinal concept. The Equitable Set
is ordinal and the matchings on the Equitable set are Rawlsian.
There is another characteristic that makes the Equitable Set
and the Equitable Algorithm particularly appealing. Although
the Equitable Set is generically not a singleton, the Equitable
Algorithm selects only one stable matching for each of the
agents priority order. Therefore the solution of the Equitable
Algorithm is unique for a given priority order.
4. STRUCTURE OF THE EQUITABLE SET
The structure of the Equitable Set  gives us a reference that
can be used to select a particular matching in the set. Let us
introduce some concepts in order to prove that the Equitable
Set is a sublattice of the set of stable outcomes in (M,W,P ).
The set of stable matchings is a lattice under the preference
relation of the participants in each side of the market. Recall
that a partially ordered set is a lattice (L;∨,∧) if sup and
inf exists for all a, b ∈L. We formally define the concepts of
Sublattice and rotation. Both concepts are used in this section.
DEFINITION 1: A Sublattice S= (K;∨,∧) of the lattice ϒ =
(L;∨,∧) is defined on a nonvoid subset K ⊆L with the prop-
erty that a, b∈K implies that a∧b, a∨b∈K (∨,∧ taken in ϒ),
and the ∧ and the ∨ of S are restrictions to K of the ∧ and the
∨ of ϒ .
We shall now formally define the concept of rotation. Let
µ be a stable matching. For any man mi let sµ(mi) denote the
first woman wj on mi ’s list such that wj strictly prefers mi to
µ(wj) (her partner in µ). Let nextµ(mi) denote the partner in
µ of a woman sµ(mi).
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DEFINITION 2: Let ρ = (m0,w0), (m1,w1), ..., (mr−1,wr−1)
be an ordered list of pairs in a stable matching µ such that
for each i (0 i r −1) mi+1 is nextµ(mi), where i+1 is taken
modulo r, i.e., mr =m0 and wr =w0. Then ρ is called an m-
rotation (exposed) in µ, and we say that mi (or wj) is in a m-
rotation ρ if there is a pair (mi,wj) in the ordered list defining
ρ.
DEFINITION 3: If µ is a stable matching, and ρ ={(m0,w0) ,
(m1,w1), . . . , (mr−1,wr−1)} is an m-rotation exposed in µ, then
µ/ρ is defined to be a matching in which each man not in ρ
stays married to his partner in µ, and each man mi in ρ mar-
ries wi+1 = sµ(mi). The transformation from µ to µ/ρ is called
elimination of ρ from µ.
DEFINITION 4: Let ρ = {(m0,w0), (m1,w1), . . . , (mr−1,wr−1)}
be an m-rotation. We say that ρ moves mi down from wi to
wi+1, and moves wi up from mi to mi−1. If w is either wi
or is strictly between wi and wi+1 in mi ’s list, then ρ moves
mi below w. Similarly, ρ moves wi above m if m is mi , or is
strictly between mi and mi−1 in wi ’s list.
Definition 4 describes what happens to each person in
ρ when ρ is eliminated from a matching µ in which it is
exposed. Essentially, each man in the rotation will have as his
match the next acceptable women in a stable matching.
For any man mi and for any woman wj in (M,W,P ) there
is at most one m-rotation that moves mi down to wj , and
wj up to mi . A m-rotation may be exposed in more than
one matching. It is not necessarily associated with a unique
matching.
Let m((P )) be the set of m-rotations between the set
of stable matchings (P ). There is another set of w-rotations
w((P )). Let us denote by ((P )) the set m((P )) ∪
w((P )) of both m and w rotations.
THEOREM 2. The Equitable Set with the preferences P is a
sublattice of (P ).
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In order to prove Theorem 2 we have to establish some
results.
DEFINITION 5: The transformation from the preferences P
to P ′ is regular if and only if:
(a) (P ′)⊆(P ) and
(b) ((P ′))⊆((P ))∪∅.
In other words, a transformation P ′ of P is regular if
and only if comparing the markets (M,W,P ) and (M,W,P ′),
the rotations are exposed and the set of stable matchings in
(M,W,P ′) are a subset of the rotations and the stable match-
ings set in the original market.
LEMMA 3. Every regular transformation P ′ of P generates a
new set of stable matchings (P ′) which is a sublattice of (P ).
Proof. We have two cases:
(a) P ′ =P which is straightforward.
(b) P ′ =P. As (P ′) is a lattice it means that for all µa,µb ∈
(P ′);µa ∧µb ∈(P ′) and µa ∨µb ∈(P ′). Because P ′ is
a regular transformation of P then µa,µb ∈(P ).
Let µa ∧µb =µβ and µa ∨µb =µα. There is an m-rotation
or a set of m-rotations πα,πβ,α,β ∈((P ′)) such that
µα/πα =µa,
µα/πβ =µb,
µa/α =µβ,
µb/β =µβ.
We need to check that µa ∧µb =µβ and µa ∨µb =µα under P
in (P ).
First, µα and µβ belong to (P ) because ((P ′)) ⊆
((P )) ∪ ∅. Moreover, all the stable matchings between µa
and µb and their infimum and supremum in (P ′) belong
to (P ). Suppose that a stable matching µc in (P ) exists
such that µa ∨ µb = µc in (P ) and µc /∈ (P ′). This means
that there is a set of rotations ω such that µc/ω = µa and
ω ⊆((P ′)). Then, there is at least one rotation ρ∗ ∈ω such
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that ρ∗ /∈((P ′)). We know that between the men’s optimal
stable matching and each one of the elements in the set of
stable matchings we always find the same rotations1. It implies
that if ρ∗ /∈((P ′)), it must be eliminated before µα. There-
fore, there is no possibility for µc to be the supremum of µa
and µb under P in (P ).
Analogously, we can prove that µβ must be the infimum of
µa and µb under P in (P ).
LEMMA 4. µM and µ
W
 are the extreme points of (P
).
This result is a direct consequence of the definition of P.
LEMMA 5. P is a regular transformation of P .
Proof. We check the two conditions:
(a) (P ′)⊆(P ) and
(b) ((P ′))⊆((P ))∪∅.
By Proposition 1, and the definition of P, we already
know that µW and µ
M
 belong to (P ) and (P
). By the
definition of P we also know that all the elements of partic-
ipants’ preferences between µW and µ
M
 remain in their posi-
tions in P. This means that all the rotations in ((P)) are
in ((P )). Since these rotations are equal to all the stable
matching in (P), they also belong to (P ).
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemmas 3–5 we know that the
Equitable Set is a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings
in every matching market.
The fact that the Equitable Set is a sublattice from the
original set of stable matching guarantees that the match-
ing on the Equitable Set are connected by rotations in the
original market. It also guarantees that the rotations on the
Equitable Set are a subset from the rotations on the origi-
nal market. Therefore, no distortion is introduced on the way
stable matchings are related.
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4.1. Computing the equitable set
The structure of the Equitable Set allows the Equitable Algo-
rithm to select one particular matching from the stable set
by choosing one particular order of agents. This order gener-
ates a priority between agents that will favour those that act
first in the Equitable Algorithm. Thus, we no longer have to
choose between men or women. The Equitable Algorithm can
prioritize some men and some women, and find a compromise
matching that is stable and favours then with respect to the
rest of the agents.
The following result establishes how to achieve any match-
ing in . It also shows how no allocation outside the Equit-
able Set can be generated by the Stable Algorithm.
THEOREM 6. For any stable matching µ◦ ∈ there is always
at least one initial order of the participants ζ ◦ such that ◦ pro-
duces µ◦.
Proof. If we have only one stable matching, every order of
the participants selects this particular matching (by Proposi-
tion 1) and the result becomes trivial. Assume that there is
more that one element in . We already know that M pro-
duces µM . If  has more than one element, it means that
there is at least one rotation exposed in µM and this rota-
tion, denoted by ρ1, can be eliminated generating a new sta-
ble matching in . Call this new stable matching µM /ρ
1 =µ1.
The center of the argument is to show how a change in ζM
can generate µ1 through .
Define a new original position for the participants ζ 0,where
ζ 0 = ζM and let ζ 1 be identical to ζ 0, except for the agents
involved in ρ1. The women in ρ1 are situated in ζ 1 just before
the men who are their partners in µM .
First, we shall prove that the change from ζ 0 to ζ 1 cannot
affect the mates of the participants not in ρ1. The proof pro-
ceeds by contradiction, assuming that ζ 1 generates a march-
ing µ′ where w1 ∈ ρ1 is matched with mi /∈ ρ1. In that case,
µM Pm′µ
′
, because the set  is a lattice. The mate of mi in
µM is wi . Therefore mi prefers wi to w1. Even if mi has
14
been forced to accept w1’s proposal when wi was available, wi
always has a chance to propose to mi later; if she does not, it
must be because wi has a partner better than mi . The same
happens with the mate of wi ’s new partner in µM . There-
fore there is a rotation ρ={(m0,w0), (m1,w1), . . . , (mr−1,wr−1)}
exposed in µM such that {(mi,wi), (m1,w1)} ∈ ρ. However, no
element can be in two rotations exposed in the same stable
matching. It means that ρ =ρ1, a contradiction.
We proceed to show how the order ζ 1 forces the rotation
ρ1 to be eliminated from the matching µM . Call w1 the first
woman to make a proposal in ζ 1. By the definition of rota-
tion, when m1 is able to make her a proposal, her mate in
µM /ρ
1 =m2 is already available. w1 prefers m2 to m1, then she
sends m2 a proposal and he has to accept. The same thing
happens with all women in ρ1 who are now proposing before
their mates in µM propose. It leads to the elimination of the
rotation ρ1, which is what we wanted to prove.
Any rotation can be eliminated using the same procedure
from a given matching and the order of agents that gener-
ates this matching. Starting in µ∗, we only have to place each
woman in the rotation to eliminate ρi before the men that
correspond to her in that rotation. This way we transform
ζ ∗ into ζ i . As we have shown before the order ζ i in the ini-
tial step of the procedure  will generate the matching µ∗/ζ
i .
Given that there is a path of rotations that leads from µM to
any matching in , it means that there is a starting order ζ ′
that eventually will lead algorithm  to the matching µ′.
PROPOSITION 7. The algorithm M generates the matching
µM regardless of the initial order of men in ζ
M.
When all men precede all women in the initial order ζM,
the Equitable Procedure generates the stable matching µM .
This matching is unique. This results follows from Theorem
6 and the fact that any change in men’s order will not gen-
erate a rotation elimination (see Definition 3). Therefore, the
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matching obtained by the algorithm will not change. An anal-
ogous result can be established for ζW .
As stated above, by fixing an order of the participants we
are determining the final matching selected by the Equitable
algorithm in . If we want to benefit a set of participants
we only need to situate them at the beginning of a particular
order ζ and  gives us the stable matching in  that treats
them better than those that are situated in ζ after them. It
is clear now how the order where all the women are situated
before any man ζW generates µW . Therefore, both µ
W
 and µ
M

are unique and independent of the order that men or women
have among themselves. This is because no change in the rel-
ative order of men or women can eliminate a rotation when
either all women precede all men or vice versa.
In Example 1, we can see that there are two non-extreme
stable matchings on . Those stable matchings can be achieved
by  if we specify the right order of the participants. In this
case, the order to achieve matching µ5 is w3, w2, m2, m3, . . .
To achieve µ6 the adequate order is w4,w1,m1,m4, . . . Notice
that the other participants’ positions are not relevant because
they have no chance to make proposals at the third step.
5. RAWLSIAN MATCHINGS
The Equitable Set has the property of reducing the conflict
between agents to the minimum that is compatible with sta-
bility. This is because no agent is forced to accept a mate if
there is a stable matching where the agent with the worse pos-
sible mate can be better of. Moreover, this minimum is not
general for all the market but effective for each submarket of
related agents. This approach is in the same spirit as the orig-
inal non-mathematical treatment of Rawls (1971) later used in
Masarani and Gokturk (1986,1989).
Given a matching market (M,W,P ) and its related set of
stable matchings (P ), let (σ) for σ ∈M ∪W be the set of
elements that may be assigned to the element σ in a stable
matching on the market (M,W,P ). We can reduce the pref-
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erence list of all individuals P to its (σ) elements. Let us
denote these preferences by P.
DEFINITION 6: Given a marriage market (M,W,P) a min-
imal decomposition or a decomposition is a set of men T ⊆M,
a set of women Y ⊆W , and a set of preference list, where the
men in T rank only women in Y and the women in Y rank
only men in T .
According to our definition, a decomposition is a parti-
tion of the participants in two or more (T , Y ) submarkets,
{(Ti, Yi), i = 1, . . . , k}, so that the set (P ) is the Cartesian
product of the sets (Ti, Yi), i = 1, . . . , k. That is, if we arbi-
trarily take one stable matching from each of the k submar-
kets of the decomposition, then the union of these matchings
is a stable matching in (P ), and every stable matching in
(P ) can be obtained in this way2.
Let us denote the position of the woman wj in mi ’s list as
rmi (wj ). Let rmi (µ) be the position of the mate of mi in the
matching µ in mi ’s list.
DEFINITION 7: A matching µ dominates in the sense of
Rawls another matching µ′ if and only if
max
for all (mi,wj )∈µ
[
rwj (µ), rmi (µ)
]
< max
for all (mi,wj )∈µ′
[
rwj (µ), rmi (µ)
]
.
DEFINITION 8: A stable matching µ∈(P ) is Rawlsian by
Partitions if and only if the stable matching µ is not domi-
nated in the sense of Rawls by any other stable matching in
this partition.
PROPOSITION 8: All the matchings in  are Rawlsian by
partitions.
Proof. Suppose that they are not. Then there exists a stable
matching such that µ is not Rawlsian by partitions. It means
that there exists a µ′ such that
max
for all (mi,wj )∈(Ti ,Yi ) in µ′
[
rwj (µ), rmi (µ)
]
< max
for all (mi,wj )∈(Ti ,Yi ) in µ
[
rwj (µ), rmi (µ)
]
.
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However, the partner of the worse participant in (Ti, Yi) in the
matching µ, let’s say mz is forced by the algorithm to pro-
pose to his partner in µ′, as are the other men in (Ti, Yi).
However at the same stage where wz is not available for mz
there is a potential partner for her, her mate in µ′. If all the
participants in (Ti, Yi) find a mate at stage K by , none of
them can make new proposals. By the definition of partition,
no participant σ /∈ (Ti, Yi) may affect the outcome. It means
that µ /∈. A contradiction.
6. FINAL REMARKS
The Equitable Algorithm has interesting characteristics. It
allows the selection of fair matchings in the sense that there
is not a stable matching where the agent with the worse pos-
sible mate can be better of. It also allows to discriminate in
the process of allocation in favor of some agents. The Equita-
ble Set is the set of stable matchings that can be selected by
the Equitable Algorithm.
A natural extension of the paper is to select ζ in a random
way. In that case, the matching finally achieved by the mech-
anism will be decided by chance. In this way we can guaran-
tee that any matching on the Equitable Set can be selected as
final matching and men and women have equal chances, ex
ante, to benefit from the algorithm. Of course, all the prop-
erties of the Equitable Set will be satisfied.
This procedure is not related to Roth and Vande (1990,
1991). They studied a randomized matching mechanism that
considers starting from any matching and then randomly
choosing a blocking pair and satisfying it if such a pair
existed. They showed that for any starting matching it is
possible to find a finite sequence of matchings such that it
reaches a stable matching. The key issue is that, with this pro-
cedure, Roth and Vande Vate can obtain any stable matching.
If ζ is selected at random and the algorithm  is applied, this
18
is not the case. In that situation, only matchings on the Equi-
table Set can be achieved.
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NOTES
1. Gusfield and Irving (1989) Lemma 2.5.7 and Corollary 2.5.2.
2. Gusfield and Irving (1989) Theorems 3.4.4 and 3.4.5.
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